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ABSTRACT
Emergencies come at the most inopportune times. Some are totally unexpected, others come with short
warnings. Although rare, an emergency comes with the potential to wreak disaster and pose serious risk to the
services provided to hematopoietic cell transplant (HCT) patients. Yet, the consequences of an emergency can
be mitigated by thinking the unthinkable and having a plan for emergency preparedness in place. Each HCT
center should develop a plan containing steps of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. This report
provides the framework for a HCT-specific emergency preparedness plan that can be used by individual
centers to develop customized guidelines on preparing for, responding to, and recovering from an emergency.
© 2006 American Society for Blood and Marrow Transplantation
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MNTRODUCTION
Hematopoietic cell transplant (HCT) centers are
t risk for many kinds of emergencies – viral epidemic,
urricane, ﬂood, tornado, power outage, earthquake,
re, bomb threat, etc. No center is immune. The
evere Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak
rose ﬁrst in Asia, and then spread elsewhere to places
uch as Toronto. The University of Toronto’s HCT
rogram was forced to halt transplants for weeks and
o make provisions for their patients elsewhere. In its
ftermath, the American Society of Blood and Marrow
ransplantation called for the formation of a commit-
ee to formulate a set of recommendations for centers
o consider in their own plans for emergency pre-
aredness.
Emergencies come in many forms and no two are
xactly alike, but they generally can be placed into two
ategories: those that arrive with some kind of advance
arning (epidemics, hurricanes, ﬂoods) and those that
ffer little or no warning (tornado, power outage,
re). This report addresses both kinds of emergencies,
ffering advice on how to prepare and things to con-
ider. It concludes with several case histories demon-
trating how the HCT community has prepared for hnd addressed emergencies and what they have
earned.
oadmap for Preparedness
Using a framework categorizing the various ele-
ents of emergency planning provided by the Joint
ommission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organi-
ations (JCAHO) (1), the committee offers the follow-
ng suggestions that each center should consider in
reparing for an emergency (JCAHO). The intent of
his is not to provide detailed speciﬁcs since each
enter has its own characteristics that include unique
trengths and vulnerabilities. Moreover, each type of
mergency will confront the center with distinct chal-
enges. Rather, this document is intended to provide
n outline of issues that should be considered in the
enter’s emergency preparedness plan.
Several elements should be contained in each cen-
er’s plan. These include steps of mitigation, pre-
aredness, response and recovery (Figure 1).
itigation (The Advance Plan)
Mitigation steps include those efforts to assess
ow your center’s services would be affected by a
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ASBMT COMMITTEE REPORT1230otential disaster. Each hospital has a disaster plan.
uch plans generally include steps to deal with inter-
al hospital situations such as ﬁre, loss of utilities, loss
f services, or bomb threat, and external exigencies
uch as casualty management, severe weather, or a
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ASBMT COMMITTEE REPORT 1231hat one can and should address now: emergency
eam, command structure, channels of communica-
ions, inpatient and outpatient capacity, reciprocal ar-
angements with other centers, public information,
tc. Especially critical for the HCT program are ar-
angements for longitudinal outpatient care services,
ince HCT patients are especially reliant on intensive
utpatient services over a long interval.
The HCT emergency plan should address the
ollowing topics: 1) the team in charge of HCT emer-
ency preparedness, 2) a command structure and iden-
iﬁcation of key individuals, 3) means of communica-
ions between individual staff members, 4) inpatient
nd outpatient capacity and stafﬁng, 5) reciprocal ar-
angements with other centers, 6) public Information
ools and media relationship skills building, 7) backup
f patient and stem cell database, and 8) a checklist of
nique HCT needs.
. Establishment of a HCT emergency team. A HCT
emergency preparedness team should be developed
(Figure 2). This team will develop the speciﬁcs of
the plan, organize the entire staff, be charged with
 The HCT Emergency 
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Figure 2. The HCT Econducting drills, overseeing training, monitoringperformance during an emergency response, and
ensuring that recovery efforts take place. The team
should include representatives of multiple key ser-
vices to gain as many perspectives as possible about
what are potential vulnerabilities and to identify as
many solutions as possible.
. A command structure and listing of individual per-
sonnel in key roles. The team should develop a
command structure list that identiﬁes who is in
charge of what. Listing the team by job title, rather
than by individual, will make the structure more
permanent and less subject to changes in
personnel.
. Mechanism of communication. A list of individual
staff members by job title should also be main-
tained in multiple locations since individual nodes
of the communication network may be disrupted.
Contact information for the staff should include
multiple types of communication and should be
maintained in multiple media forms. Examples of
types of communication include pagers, land-based
telephones, cellular phones, internet, and public
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ASBMT COMMITTEE REPORT1232placed include inpatient and outpatient nursing sta-
tions, stem cell laboratories, homes of key individ-
uals, etc. Because this information will become
outdated, a schedule for routine replacement, e.g.,
monthly or bi-monthly, should be implemented.
. Inpatient and outpatient capacity. An assessment of
one’s program’s capacity, how it might be affected
by an emergency, and planning for “surge” capacity
or provisions for reduced capacity is advisable.
One’s center may face a shortage of inpatient or
critical care beds due to either an inﬂux of patients
hospitalized from injuries or illness from the emer-
gency event or an inability to discharge patients
because of a lack of community services, housing or
transportation. Similarly, outpatient and home care
services may be severely affected resulting in a need
to hospitalize outpatients. One consideration to
weigh is whether there are any possibilities to tem-
porarily increase capacity and what steps would be
needed to make it happen. One should consider
delay of new transplant procedures wherever pos-
sible to free up beds. Strong consideration should
be given to relocation of patients whenever possi-
ble to communities not affected (see below). For
patients needing intensive outpatient care that is
disrupted by the emergency, one may consider ad-
mitting them early to ensure an inpatient bed.
. Reciprocal arrangements with other centers. De-
velopment of a relationship with one or more
neighboring “buddy” centers that may assist in
assuming care of patients if one’s center cannot
accommodate needed patient care may be useful;
joint practices and communications testing be-
tween the two centers periodically is advisable. One
should consider a relationship of one center in the
same FEMA district and one in a different FEMA
district. Consider establishing videoconfenercing
facilities to maintain educational programs in the
event that some centers will be quarantined.
. Public Information tools and media relationship
skills building. Learning some basic media rela-
tions skills is important. Knowing in advance the
contact numbers of local radio and television sta-
tions that are good conduits of public information
is important and may be used to communicate with
staff (see below under Response). This is best done
in conjunction with the public relations depart-
ment of the hospital which is well placed to co-
ordinate announcements from the hospital, espe-
cially its command center, as well as municipal,
state and federal authorities so that a consistent
message is conveyed.
. Backup of patient and stem cell database. All hos-
pital patient information systems have extensive
backup precautions to prevent loss of patient data.
The BMT program’s customized database of pa-
tient and stem cell information may be part of thehospital system or maintained separately. If the
latter, it is important to have backup systems in
place, preferably with a copy of the database off
site.
. Checklist of speciﬁc HCT needs. A checklist of
speciﬁc HCT concerns should be created and
maintained (Figure 3). For each concern, the cen-
ter should develop speciﬁc local plans. Below are
suggestions based on various committee members’
experiences of speciﬁc emergencies faced by their
program.
Staff. Stafﬁng shortages for both inpatient and
outpatient services may occur. Shortages may
arise from disruption of staff from getting to and
from work or some may need to be excluded from
patient care. This is most relevant for an infec-
tious or radiation event where certain staff may
have exposures that would be hazardous for pa-
tients. Pregnant women may need special provi-
sions for either infectious or radiation events.
Provision for staff support (child care, transpor-
tation, etc) may be necessary since some emer-
gencies may result in school or childcare closures,
affecting dependent children of staff members.
Some centers have set up on-site temporary
childcare for staff needed to provide essential ser-
vices. Relief of on-duty staff should also be
planned. One should ensure that multiple means
of communication with individual staff members
are maintained (as noted above) since disruption
of one or more types of communication may
occur. Setting up a list of volunteer staff in ad-
vance can be useful.
Stem cell products. Electricity may be disrupted
in any number of emergencies. Generally, gener-
ator backup systems will quickly restore electric-
ity. One should assess whether or not critical stem
cell collection equipment and stem cell process-
ing instruments have access to electrical outlets
that are supplied by the backup electrical supply.
If any key instruments are not, corrective action
in advance or alternative planning will reduce the
likelihood of a crucial process disruption. In the
event of an anticipated disaster, facilities should
consider ordering additional tanks of liquid nitro-
gen in order to have a back up supply.
Transportation of a stem cell product from
collection site to transplant center may be dis-
rupted and may jeopardize timely delivery (or
collection) of stem cell products from other lo-
cales, especially of unrelated donor or cord blood
products. Contact with the National Marrow Do-
nor Program (NMDP) or other donor registry/
bank to coordinate delivery is crucial. If there is
advance warning, one may consider earlier collec-
tion and delivery. If the center is scheduled to
provide stem cells for another center, as for ex-
ASBMT COMMITTEE REPORT 1233 The HCT Emergency Preparedness Checklist 
• Hospital capacity 
o Inpatient beds 
o Critical care beds 
o Outpatient clinic services   
• Staffing
o Adequate numbers for patient care 
o Staff support needs 
• Stem cell products 
o Transportation (when products are collected at another site).
o Stem cell apheresis 
o Liquid nitrogen tanks 
• Transfusion support for blood products 
• Infection control
• Relocation of patients 
o Dispersal of patients to communities not affected by disaster 
o Contact with colleagues/centers that may assist in assuming care of 
patients. 
o Transfusion products (including irradiation and CMV appropriate 
arrangements)   
• Public services for patients and staff 
o Public sanitation, potable water, electricity, other public services 
o Housing for patients.
• Computerized information systems backup 
• Media relations.Figure 3. The HCT Emergency Preparedness Checklist
●●
●
●
P
M
b
s
o
d
t
K
r
t
r
e
s
w
m
s
c
w
f
e
g
t
w
s
t
i
m
t
d
ASBMT COMMITTEE REPORT1234ample the NMDP, the coordinator should inform
the NMDP that the center is not able to collect
cells from an unrelated donor and ship.
Ability to conduct apheresis in patients or
donors whose mobilization procedure has already
begun may be affected. A donor or patient may be
in the midst of mobilization when an emergency
prevents timely collection of the product or the
recipient may already have received an ablative
conditioning regimen. Decisions as to aborting
the collection or revision of the collection process
may be needed.
Transfusion support. Supply of blood products
for patients in need of transfusion support may be
threatened. When a disaster strikes a community,
volunteer activities such as blood donation may
be seriously affected or disrupted. Changes in
transfusion thresholds may be necessary. Close
communication with one’s blood bank and re-
gional blood collection center is crucial.
Infection control. Development of a close work-
ing relationship with the Infection Control Ofﬁ-
cer or team in one’s institution long in advance of
an emergency is strongly encouraged. Infection
control experts have much to teach transplant
clinicians and likewise they have much to learn
from transplant clinicians about the unique needs
of HCT patients. Familiarity of the Infection
Control team with speciﬁc HCT team’s concerns
and practices will facilitate useful and constructive
advice during an emergency. If the emergency is
an infectious event, this relationship will have
crucial meaning. Criteria for determining if cer-
tain staff should be excluded need to be developed
with the coordination with Infection Control. An
assessment of the availability of at least some
easily accessible negative pressure rooms available
to assess outpatients - really critical for BMT
patients is important, especially in the event of an
infectious event.
Relocation of patients. It may be necessary to
consider the possibility of relocating patients
away from the HCT center and dispersing them
to local health care providers in communities not
affected by disaster. If the center ﬁnds that it
cannot provide key services, has a reduced capac-
ity, or the public services outside of the center are
compromised, then return of some (or most) pa-
tients to health providers in communities not af-
fected may be the most prudent course of action.
Whenever possible, this should be anticipated if
there is advance warning, and, if not, done as
early as possible once the need becomes apparent.
This can alleviate pressure on overburdened staff
and facilities and optimizes delivery of needed
services to patients who cannot be relocated. If
relocation is done, one should remember that carrangements for blood transfusion support is
key, with appropriate communication as to pro-
visions for irradiation and CMV appropriate
products (or ﬁltration alternatively).
Public services. Interruption of public services,
such as transportation, potable water, sanitation,
electricity, and other public services may have an
enormous impact on one’s ability to provide clin-
ical services even if the center’s internal opera-
tions are not affected. Interruption of public ser-
vices will affect both patients and staff. If roads
are blocked or public transportation disrupted,
patients and staff may not be able to get to and
from the center. This may lead to certain staff
working overtime or the need to curtail services,
especially outpatient clinics. Lack of basic services
(or transportation) may make it impossible to
discharge patients who could be ordinarily dis-
charged. Flooding or structural damage to hous-
ing may lead to lack of residential facilities for
patients who are temporary residents in the trans-
plant center’s community.
reparedness (The People and their Training)
A recent study released by the Institute for Crisis
anagement (2) indicates that only one-fourth of
usiness crises are wholly unexpected. Portending
igns or warnings often are unheeded. Events that are
f low probability (but with enormous potential for
isaster) are disregarded. Instead of preparing for
hem, they are dismissed. Events such as Hurricane
atrina demonstrate the folly of such lack of prepa-
ation.
There are two principles. First, it is never too early
o begin preparedness. Second, the most important
esource one has to get one’s program through the
mergency is one’s staff. Education and training of the
taff is key. All of the staff will be called upon to deal
ith various concerns that arise. These include phar-
acy, social services, laboratory staff, transportation
ervices, etc.
Although the natural tendency is to plan for spe-
iﬁc events, e.g., Here’s what we do for a ﬂood. Here’s
hat we do for a terrorist attack. Here’s what we do
or a terrorist attack during a ﬂood with and without
lectrical disruption. This type of planning quickly
ets totally impractical and overwhelming. Instead,
he emphasis should be to have a general plan that
orks for all possible disasters. (This can be fairly
imple - collect information, convene the team, get
he tickler list, start talking, make assignments [includ-
ng collecting more information], decide on next
eeting time, get started with implementation). Once
he plan is in place, you can add some event-speciﬁc
etails, like in Florida or Gulf coast, add the hurri-
ane. In Oklahoma, add the tornado, etc. Some plan-
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ASBMT COMMITTEE REPORT 1235ing for speciﬁc types of emergencies one’s center is
ost likely to face is advisable. For infectious event
mergencies, minimizing the risk for spread of the
nfection is of highest priority. Brainstorming ways to
ompensate for possible disruption of public services
nd a discussion of how the staff can help each other
ay be useful.
Periodic review of the plan by the emergency
reparedness team is important. Speciﬁc kinds of
mergencies may be more likely than others and cus-
omized plans for such events are prudent. The con-
uct of periodic practice drills is crucial.
For an event in which some warning is present,
everal measures may be useful:
Preparation and updating of lists of part-time or
retired staff or staff willing to work extra may be
quite useful.
Careful consideration for removal of patients to
other communities not expected to be affected.
Review of the hospital emergency preparedness
plan (to understand how patients’ needs will ﬁt
into the larger context of what the hospital’s ca-
pacity is and to identify administrative authorities
one should consult when help is needed).
Determine if surge capacity of inpatient beds or
outpatient clinic capacity can be boosted.
Review equipment and food supplies and bring in
extra supplies or equipment if needed.
Determine if extra supplies or preparations are
needed for the speciﬁc emergency one faces or is
likely to face. For example, in emergencies involv-
ing an infectious agent, ensuring adequate sup-
plies of protective wear and equipment and set-
ting aside additional isolation rooms may be
possible. For a high wind or water emergency,
movement of patients away from windows or ar-
eas prone to ﬂooding would be prudent.
esponse
Once an emergency occurs, one must manage its
onsequences. This may include triage of patients who
eed inpatient or outpatient services, institution of
solation procedures, clinical management of patients
s medical issues arise, or abatement of infection
pread between patients and among staff. The team
hould aim to be ﬂexible, ready to improvise, and to
djust its actions if they are not working as anticipated.
t is important to remember that even events that had
een anticipated by the plan may unfold differently
nd unforeseen developments may occur and impro-
isation may be crucial for success.
The emergency team should meet on a regular
asis throughout the response period and into the
ecovery phase. Each time the team meets, they
hould consider methodically, “What’s happening to-
ay?”, “What will happen tomorrow and within the eext few days?” and, importantly, “What will happen
hen this is all over?” In some instances it is appro-
riate to subdivide the team and assign speciﬁc re-
ponsibilities. Depending upon the magnitude of the
vent, individuals may need to have their energies,
hich may be limited, focused upon manageable tasks.
ecause of the importance of the HCT program
ithin the institution, a representative of the HCT
mergency team should be a member of the institu-
ional command center committee, thereby ensuring
wo-way communication – a critical component for
ffective action during a potentially very confusing
ime.
Addressing the media may become important and
an represent a useful means of communication with
atients and staff, serving as an early warning system
o notify patients of clinic closures, sharing informa-
ion among staff in the event of failure of other means
f communication, providing local expertise to edu-
ate the public, and dispelling needless fears. Impor-
ant to remember is that how you deliver your mes-
age is as important as the content of your message;
ne should aim to emphasize compassion for victims
f the emergency, demonstrate that your team is in
harge and indicate what steps are being taken to
ddress the situation (3). Coordination with one’s hos-
ital public relations staff is essential.
ecovery
After the acute crisis abates, then measures must
e taken to return the service back to normal activities.
he team should meet to determine when and how to
hase in functions that had been placed on hold,
ependent on availability of staff, capacity, supplies,
tc. Timing is key and should be coordinated with
ospital administrative staff.
An important issue to remember is the emotional
oll on the staff of handling the emergency (as well as
he impact of the emergency on the staff’s families).
imilarly, there may also be physical exhaustion from
xtra work shifts worked. Special efforts are necessary
o address both collective and individual staff con-
erns.
The team should conduct an assessment of what
orked, what did not work and what occurred that
as unanticipated. The plan should be carefully re-
iewed and revisions should be made as needed for
uture emergencies.
ase Histories
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): The
ARS epidemic, starting in March 2003, caught To-
onto, and indeed, Canada unprepared. By the time it
as contained in Toronto it had involved more than
50 probable cases, resulted in 43 deaths and cost an
stimated one billion dollars. A striking aspect to the
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ASBMT COMMITTEE REPORT1236ealthcare workers directly involved at the onset of
he epidemic was the uncertainty surrounding the
ode of transmission of the disease, its surveillance,
ontainment and management. While initially this led
o some confusion, healthcare workers experienced a
ather steep learning curve as the epidemic progressed
nd more information about the nature of the infec-
ive organism became known and available. In retro-
pect, several issues emerge as important to the man-
gement of a HCT Program during this period. One
as surveillance at the hospital entrance of patients
ith clinic appointments. Requirements of surveil-
ance included obtaining a history of contact with
ossible or probable cases, a history of symptoms,
ncluding fever, and a tympanic temperature measure-
ent. The challenge was to distinguish possible symp-
oms of SARS from the expected symptoms and signs
n the many patients with febrile neutropenia visiting
he clinic. Some of these patients required further
valuation, and because they were initially to be re-
arded as possible cases of SARS, physical examina-
ion needed to be conducted in a negative pressure
oom. This was a particular challenge for those med-
cal facilities that lacked adequate numbers of (or in-
eed, any) negative pressure rooms. Moreover, patient
and staff- separate entrance) surveillance invariably
esulted in queuing at hospital entrances at peak times
hich was uncomfortable to those waiting outside in
he cold. The lessons here include the need for an
dequate number of negative pressure rooms in the
ut-patient clinic setting and the importance of regu-
ar information sessions to medical staff regarding the
utbreak so that they can interact effectively with
atients (and their co-workers).
One approach in containing the outbreak was to
uarantine healthcare workers to their home because
hey exhibited fever and/or respiratory symptoms (in
ost cases an innocuous URI) and had no likely con-
act or individuals who had contact with possible cases
f SARS. These individuals were monitored regularly
y public health personnel. Either way they were no
onger available as healthcare workers resulting in
educed stafﬁng in medical units, including HCT pro-
rams. The lesson here is that transplant volume
eeds to be adjusted nimbly to accommodate the con-
iderable reductions in healthcare staff that can occur
uickly.
Another, perhaps unexpected issue was the initial
hortage of N95 masks for healthcare workers and the
eed to have them ﬁt-tested. A number of cases of
ARS arose in healthcare workers who were inade-
uately protected. The lesson here is that it is vital to
how strong support to front-line staff at risk of ex-
osure. It was particularly important to protect staff in
egular contact with immunocompromised patients
ot only for their own sake but to ensure the safety of
he transplant unit. cAnother important issue arose from decisions by
overnment agencies regarding restrictions on the trans-
er of patients from one institution to another. For in-
titutions performing HCT that lacked their own inten-
ive care units, this posed a major logistical issue in
lanning transplants. In some cases, they were post-
oned because of the lack of availability of acute care
ervices or were transferred to other institutions if this
as permitted by government directives. The lesson
rom this experience is that input from transplant direc-
ors is important when planning is done and should be
ntegrated at all levels of decision-making.
Another, and perhaps minor issue when viewed in
he context of a serious event such as SARS, is that
linical research came to a virtual standstill during this
eriod. Moreover, the often touted virtue of closer in-
eraction between clinician researchers and basic scien-
ists (extending to the location of scientists within hos-
itals) served to work against both, but especially the
atter, when directives requested “non-essential” staff to
ot enter the hospital. Nonetheless, much is to be gained
y the physical location of basic with clinical investiga-
ors in medical centers and the lack of productivity dur-
ng periods of crisis is probably a small price to pay.
Terrorist attack (Sept 11): Within a span of a few
ours on September 11, 2001, all commercial air traf-
c in the United States was halted. Three National
arrow Donor Program (NMDP) collections were
nderway when their couriers’ ﬂights were cancelled.
wo more NMDP couriers were already en route on
nternational ﬂights that were ordered to return to
urope. But these were merely the collections in
rogress on September 11; more than 35 additional
ollections were already planned to occur over the
ext seven days. Most of the intended recipients had
lready begun conditioning therapy.
The NMDP was pushed into emergency manage-
ent. Many questions had to be posed and addressed
ver the next few hours and days. Among them: How
any collections could be postponed? Which planned
ransplants were non-myeloablative? How likely was
round transport? Could some products be frozen for
few days? Surely someone would be able to ﬂy
rgent products, but who? The military? Private cor-
orations? Private couriers? The questions arose as
uickly as the shock surrounding the magnitude of the
isaster.
What happened over the next several days was, in
hort, a little bit of everything. The NMDP emer-
ency management team met twice daily to receive
pdates and address issues. Innumerable inquiries
ere made to transplant centers, donor centers, col-
ection facilities, potential air carriers, and couriers.
nternational colleagues without hesitation subjected
he collected products to cryopreservation and offered
o freeze others as needed. Several transplants and
ollections were rescheduled. Multiple products were
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ASBMT COMMITTEE REPORT 1237riven within and between states, including a mara-
hon relay trip from Ohio to Texas. The NMDP
nvestigated several air transportation options, but in
he end chartered several ﬂights from commercial
edical carriers, including a roundtrip to Europe to
eliver one product and retrieve stranded couriers
ith their frozen products.
In the end, an additional critical effort was plan-
ing for the aftermath. NMDP needed to anticipate
he new screening for air travelers, including fears of
ouriers and the inevitable insistence upon x-ray in-
pection of products. The NMDP needed to antici-
ate the surge of activities that would follow the post-
11 decline. The NMDP needed to formalize the
mergency responses that we had made so that we
ould learn from this disaster and prepare for the next.
A stormy day in Gainesville: The clouds replaced the
unny skies one week in August, 2004. The wind grew.
he hurricane approached Gainesville’s direction, but
he projected path looked like “the city” would be only
inimally affected. The BMT leadership team met,
aid out plans, and felt conﬁdent that they were pre-
ared. Or, so they thought. Call schedules had been
einforced. A plan for clinic closure had been put in
orce. The storm’s path veered in Gainesville’s direc-
ion. As the winds grew and the rain whipped the
ommunity, residents bunkered down.
After the winds and rains passed, the BMT team
ssessed the damage. Fortunately, the hospital re-
ained physically intact and fully functional. A belea-
uered staff persevered and all services during that
rightful 48 hours were rendered successfully. How-
ver, the effect on the community outside was quite
ifferent. The treasured tree canopy that cooled the
ity in the summer now was strewn all around, crush-
ng homes, knocking down power lines, and blocking
oads. Electricity was out for two-thirds of homes,
otable water was unavailable for many, sanitation
ystems became non-functional and dumped sewage
nto rivers and streams. Flooding from 15 inches of
ain covered many neighborhoods, making many
omes uninhabitable and roads impassable.
The lingering aftereffects were worse. For most of a
eek residents and staff spent digging out and putting
heir lives back together. Staff could not get to work due
o ﬂooded or impassable roads. Those that could get to
ork had to bring their children because schools were
ow evacuation centers. The BMT team set up childcare
n part of the BMT clinic. It was a struggle relieving the
atigued staff at work all week long. The team quickly
an out of inpatient beds. Patients could not be dis-
harged since they had no place to go to; the staff was
nable to admit neutropenic patients to treat infections
ince not only were theHCTunit’s beds ﬁlled, the entire
ospital was at capacity; there were no home care agen-
ies to help out. Blood supplies ran low initially, but
ecovered quickly.The team staggered through the recovery period.
radually the team resumed more and more services.
ithin two weeks the service had returned to its usual
perations.
Several weeks later another hurricane headed in
he direction of Gainesville. The HCT leadership
eam met again to prepare again. This time, the team
as smarter. In advance, the team began dispersing
atients back to their communities not in the path of
he storm. Stem cell collections were cancelled.
ransplant admissions were cancelled. The team
mptied as many beds as possible. Those receiving
ntensive outpatient care were admitted, if they could
ot return to another community out of the storm’s
ath. The storm veered away from Gainesville at the
ast minute and the center was unaffected. But, the
eam was convinced that had it kept on course it would
ave fared much better.
ONCLUSION
Catastrophic events such as terrorist attacks, tsu-
ami, hurricane, regional blackouts, earthquakes, and
ARS have reminded all of us of our vulnerabilities.
e have all been witnesses to responses that have at
imes been gratifying and life-saving and yet at other
imes have seen responses that embarrassed us and
eemed to magnify rather than alleviate suffering. Ef-
ective response and recovery begin with prepared-
ess. Each HCT program should develop an emer-
ency preparedness plan that accommodates local
esources and addresses local vulnerabilities. Adequate
reparedness has the potential to safeguard our efforts
o alleviate suffering of our patients. [1-3]
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